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The mens rea for knowing receipt
by John Breslin
When a bank or other financial 
institution handles or receives the 
proceeds of crime or other wrongdoing, 
it faces the prospect of liability to the 
victims under a number of headings.o
These include liability in tort for 
negligence (Barclays Bank pic v Quincecare 
[1988] 1 FTLR, [1992] 4 All ER 363), 
breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive 
trusteeship. Liability can be either 
personal or proprietary. Constructive 
trusteeship, until recently, involved two 
distinct alternative elements: liability for 
knowingly assisting in a dishonest breach 
of trust; and liability for knowing receipt 
of trust property, knowing its transfer to 
be in breach of trust (Barnes vAddv (1874) 
9 Ch App 244). The traditional thinking 
on knowing assistance has been 
excoriated by the Privy Council (Royal 
Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 3 All 
ER 97). The preference is now to 
concentrate on the dishonesty of the 
accessory rather than the state of mind of 
the original perpetrator of the wrong. 
That case has left the law on knowing 
receipt in something of a state of disarray. 
However recent Commonwealth 
decisions point to some trends growing 
in the courts' approach to the issue.
THE BADEN FORMULA
The key question in the debate has 
been 'What state of mind is required of 
the knowing assistant/recipient to fix him 
with liability?' - Or, to adopt the 
vocabulary of the criminal law, 'What 
mens rea is required?' In the Baden case 
counsel adopted a formula to grade 
possible states of mind along the 
spectrum of culpability. As is well known, 
the nuances of mens rea were identified as 
follows:
(1) actual knowledge;
(2) wilfully shutting one's eyes to the 
obvious;
(3) wilfully and recklessly failing to 
make such enquiries as an honest 
and reasonable person would 
make;
(4) knowledge of circumstances which 
would have indicated the facts to an 
honest and reasonable man; and
(5) knowledge of circumstances which 
would put an honest and reasonable 
man on inquiry.
The formula has not provided a useful 
touchstone for the attribution of liability; 
the courts' approach has been 
inconsistent. Indeed as regards liability
O J
for knowing assistance Millett EJ has said 
that the formula serves no useful 
purpose. The proper approach, in that 
context, is to treat the matter as a 'jury 
question': would a jury regard the 
assistant as having acted as an honest 
person would have done? (Agip (Africa) 
Ltd v Jackson [1992] 4 All ER 385). The 
Privy Council has embraced this and has 
pointed out the inherent limitations in 
the Baden formula.
One would have thought that, given 
the complexity of the subject matter, 
abandoning the Baden formula could be 
criticised for oversimplifying the test. It is 
thought, however, that these shades of 
state of mind complicate what is 
essentially a basic value judgment. Did 
the defendant act as an honest person 
would? Honesty is stated to be an 
objective criterion to be judged in the 
light of commercial circumstances.o
However, in so reformulating the test in 
the context of accessory liability', the Privy 
Council has defined dishonesty as 
'commercially unacceptable conduct' 
(Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 
3 All ER 97). This lowering of the' O
threshold leaves banks and other financial 
intermediaries wide open to liability.
The rejection of the Baden formula by 
the Privy Council in Tan has not been 
universally followed even in the UK (see 
Brinks Ltd v Aba Saleh (No 3) [1995] 3 
WER 640. However, it has strong 
academic and judicial support (Birks (ed) 
Frontiers of Liability Oxford: OUR 1994).
MEGARRY v MILLETT
The courts have not found it easy to 
decide upon a firm test of the proper 
standard of culpability to justify liability 
for knowing receipt. Megarry VC in Re 
Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264, 
[1992] 4 All ER 308, at p. 409, favoured 
a test which evaluates (perhaps in a
somewhat benign fashion) the effect of 
receipt on the conscience of the 
recipient. Accordingly only where a want 
of probity is shown will the recipient be 
held liable. However, Millett EJ, writing 
extra-judicially (Tracing the Proceeds of 
Fraud (1991) 107 EQR 71), sharply 
criticised this approach. His view was 
that liability is receipt based, not fault 
based, although he stops short of 
suggesting that liability is strict. So 
classified, the action based on liability for 
knowing receipt is an element of the law 
of restitution   thereby making available 
the defence of change of position (Lipkin 
Gorman v Karpnale Etd [1991] 2 AC 548; 
South Tyneside Metropolitan BC v Svenska 
International pic [1995] 1 All ER 545; 
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v 'Birmingham City 
Council [1996] 3 WER 1139; Svenska 
Handelsbanken v Sun Alliance [1996] 1 
Eloyd's Rep 519; Friends Provident Life 
Office v Hillier Parker May S^Rowden [1997] 
QB 85).
Millett also takes the view that there 
can be no liability for knowing receipt 
where the receipt is otherwise than for 
the recipient's own use and benefit. 
Where the funds are credited to an 
overdraft or loan account, this is receipt 
for the bank's own use and benefit. But 
this is not so in the case of receipt of 
funds to the credit of a bank account 
which does not have a debit balance. As a 
matter of law and fact, this is (with the 
greatest of respect) unconvincing. When 
a bank receives funds, it obtains legal title 
to them and can use them as it sees fit. 
This is the case irrespective of what type 
of account the bank books the receipt to: 
the posting or appropriation of receipts is 
purely a matter of record keeping (Kinlan 
v Ulster Bank Ltd [1928] IR 171).
The principal significance of a bank 
receiving money and recording the 
receipt by posting it to the credit of an 
overdrawn account is that in such a 
situation the bank obtains a commercial 
benefit (in the reduction of the credit risk 
inherent in the customer's liability to it). 
In these circumstances the courts have, 
rightly, been more ready to impute to the 
bank actual or constructive knowledge of
a breach of trust or fiduciary duty by the 
customer (Cunningham v Northern Banking 
Co Ltd [1928] NI 113; Lankshear v ANZ 
Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1993] 1 
NZLR 481). Accordingly, where money is 
received and the receipt results in a 
reduction ol the fiduciary customer's 
liability to the bank, it may well be easier 
to fix the bank with liability than if the 
customer has an overall credit balance 
with the bank so that the effect on the 
bank's risk profile is neutral (the 
comments here apply equally where the 
bank exercises its common law (or in 
Ireland implied contractual) right of set- 
off). But this distinction does not depend 
on the nature of the bank's proprietary 
interest in the money; rather it goes to 
the surrounding circumstances which 
ought to put the bank on a higher state of 
alert, given that it will derive commercial 
benefit from the breach of trust or 
fiduciary duty.
RECENT COMMONWEALTH 
CASE LAW
There have been two significant cases 
reported in the post-Ton era which imply 
that the Baden formula has a continued 
function in the assessment of knowing 
receipt liability, if not in the context of 
accessory liability.
The first is the judgment of Smellie J in 
the New Zealand High Court in Equiticorp 
Industries Group Ltd v The Crown [1996] 3 
NZLR 586. The case concerned a 
complex financing arrangement which 
amounted to unlawful financial assistance 
by a company in respect of a purchase of 
its own shares. A central question was 
whether the Crown, having received the 
purchase money, was liable as a knowing 
recipient. Smellie J held that knowledge 
in any of the first three of the Baden 
criteria would suffice to ground liability. 
These are actual knowledge; wilfully 
shutting one's eyes to the obvious; and 
wilfully or recklessly failing to make such 
inquiries as an honest and reasonable 
person would have made. In particular, 
he held that it was no defence, in the 
circumstances, that the defendant had 
paid away the money received.
The second is the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Citadel 
General Assurance Co v Lloyds Bank Canada 
(1997) 152 DLR (4th) 411. In that case 
the plaintiff insurance company brought 
proceedings against the defendant bank 
which handled accounts for a company 
(Drive On) which received motor
insurance premiums in trust for the 
plaintiff. Drive On, and its related 
company (also a customer of the bank) 
were in financial difficulty. The bank, on 
the instructions of the directors of those 
companies, transferred funds from the 
Drive On account (which represented 
funds held in trust by Drive On for the 
plaintiff) to the account of the related 
company, so as to reduce its overdraft. 
The Supreme Court held that the bank 
could not be held liable for knowing 
assistance: such liability could only be 
imposed if it actually knew of the breach 
of trust by Drive On, was reckless to it, 
or wilfully turned a blind eye to the 
obvious (Air Canada v M&J. Travel Ltd 
[1993] 3 SCR 787). However liability 
was imposed on the bank for knowing 
receipt. The bank, by reducing the 
related company's overdraft with the 
trust funds held by it on behalf of Drive 
On, had received the funds to its own use 
and benefit. Constructive knowledgeo
would suffice for such liabilitv to be fixed 
to the bank: i.e. failing to make enquiries 
in circumstances where an honest and 
reasonable person would do so.
The Supreme Court endorsed Millett's 
view that liability for knowing receipt is a 
restitutionary remedy. The Supreme 
Court also preferred Millett's view (over 
that of Megarry V-C) that there should be 
two different standards respectively for 
knowing assistance and knowing receipt. 
By classifying knowing receipt liability as 
restitutionary, the court impliedly 
incorporates the possibility of the 
defence of change of position.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the much criticised 
decisions in Selangor United Rubber Estates 
Ltd v Cradock [1968] 2 All ER 1073 and 
Karak Rubber Co Ltd v Burden (No 2) 
[1972] 1 All ER 1210 the courts have 
grappled with the difficulties involved in 
creating a benchmark for liability in this 
area (see Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin 
Books, 1982), at p. 514; Paget's Law of 
Banking 9th edn: ed Megrah and Ryder 
(Butterworths, 1982), at p. 225). The 
task is to identify a standard of 
misconduct sufficient to warrant the 
imposition of personal or proprietary 
liability while at the same time taking 
into account business realities. For 
example, as Steyn J pointed out in Barclays 
Bank pic v Quincecare [1992] 4 All ER 363 
at p. 380, banks are not required to be 
amateur detectives. However, they
cannot also claim merely to be automatic 
handlers of customers' money so that 
they are always under an absolute duty to 
deal with customers' money as they are 
mandated, irrespective of suspicious 
circumstances (Per Brightman J in Karak 
Rubber Co Ltd v Burden (No 2) [1972]).
It is not entirely clear if the Tan 
criterion of dishonesty as 'commercially 
unacceptable conduct' affords enough 
scope to banks and other financial 
intermediaries to carry on business 
reasonably free from legal risk. Equally, it 
is not clear if pigeonholing knowing 
receipt liability into the (as yet) relatively 
amorphous category of restitutionary 
liability is going to be universally 
workable.
What is clear is that both these 
developments do nothing to alleviate the 
concerns of banks and other financial 
institutions, or their advisers. 
Furthermore, there is a discernible trend 
to contemplate concurrent liability in 
contract and tort, and in tort and 
fiduciary law (Henderson v Merrctt 
Syndicates [1995] AC 145: see, 
respectively, the judgments of Lords Goff 
and Browne-Wilkinson). The taking of a 
risk which the judge ultimately deems to 
be unacceptable may well mean that all 
these various forms of liability rain   like 
missiles   from aggrieved third parties on 
the bank.
The great American judge, Mr Justice 
Holmes, said the following about the law 
of contracts:
'The law is always approaching, and never 
reaching, consistency... It will become entirely 
consistent when it ceases to grow' (quoted 
by Hughes Parry in The Sanctity oj 
Contracts in English Law (London: Stevens 
& Sons Limited, 1959) at p. 77).
While accepting that the law, dealing as 
it does with human behaviour, will never 
achieve mathematical equilibrium, 
nonetheless the law in the area of 
constructive trusteeship has a long way to 
go before one can say that it has achieved 
even an acceptable level of 
consistency, w
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